With a view to bringing about significant improvements to the criminal justice system in all its dimensions, the “Riforma Cartabia” aims at conquering the “middle ground”: with the main purpose of strengthening the filtering role against reckless charges (whether incomplete or erroneous) with a view to reducing the number of cases, Legislative Decree no. 150/2022 outlines a new procedural procedure to be followed by the judge in the event of rectification of a charge which – although complete in all its aspects – does not conform to the findings emerging from the trial documents. In this way, the legislature generates an insurmountable paradox: on the one hand, the review role of the prosecuting magistrate is strengthened (this time explicitly) and he ends up taking the place of the public prosecutor in the formulation of the charge; on the other hand, the prosecutor’s role is strengthened (this time explicitly) and he is in fact replaced by the prosecutor in the formulation of the charge. in the formulation of the indictment; on the other hand, the judge loses the power to independently re-qualify the fact (as, moreover, provided by article 521, paragraph 1, c.p.p. for the trial phase), having in any case to transmit the acts to the prosecuting body to contest the amended charge. It does not seem superfluous to question the advisability of keeping alive a phase that, despite its good track record during the “trial time”, is no longer able to fulfill its functions because of a system that has been overhauled compared to the one outlined by the 1988 Code.
Nell’ottica di apportare significativi miglioramenti al sistema penale in ogni sua dimensione, la “Riforma Cartabia” punta alla conquista della “terra di mezzo”, l’udienza preliminare: con il precipuo intento di rafforzare il ruolo di filtro contro le imputazioni azzardate, il d.lgs. n. 150/2022 delinea un nuovo iter procedurale che il g.u.p. è tenuto a seguire nel caso di rettifica dell’addebito che – seppur completo in tutti i suoi aspetti – non è conforme alle risultanze emergenti dagli atti processuali. Per questa via, il legislatore genera un insormontabile paradosso: da una parte, rafforza il ruolo di controllo del giudicante che finisce, di fatto, per sostituirsi al p.m. nella formulazione dell’imputazione; dall’altra, l’organo della giurisdizione perde, in udienza preliminare, il potere di qualificare autonomamente il fatto (come, peraltro, previsto dall’art. 521, comma 1, c.p.p. per la fase dibattimentale), dovendo in ogni caso trasmettere gli atti all’organo dell’accusa per contestare l’addebito modificato. Alla luce di tali considerazioni, non sembra superfluo interrogarsi sull’opportunità di mantenere in vita una fase che, nonostante la buona prova di sé nel “tempo di sperimentazione”, non è più in grado di adempiere alle sue funzioni in ragione di un sistema stravolto rispetto a quello delineato dal codice del 1988.
LE MODIFICHE “FISIOLOGICHE” DELL’IMPUTAZIONE E I RINNOVATI POTERI DI CONTROLLO DEL GIUDICE DELL’UDIENZA PRELIMINARE
Nocerino
2025-01-01
Abstract
With a view to bringing about significant improvements to the criminal justice system in all its dimensions, the “Riforma Cartabia” aims at conquering the “middle ground”: with the main purpose of strengthening the filtering role against reckless charges (whether incomplete or erroneous) with a view to reducing the number of cases, Legislative Decree no. 150/2022 outlines a new procedural procedure to be followed by the judge in the event of rectification of a charge which – although complete in all its aspects – does not conform to the findings emerging from the trial documents. In this way, the legislature generates an insurmountable paradox: on the one hand, the review role of the prosecuting magistrate is strengthened (this time explicitly) and he ends up taking the place of the public prosecutor in the formulation of the charge; on the other hand, the prosecutor’s role is strengthened (this time explicitly) and he is in fact replaced by the prosecutor in the formulation of the charge. in the formulation of the indictment; on the other hand, the judge loses the power to independently re-qualify the fact (as, moreover, provided by article 521, paragraph 1, c.p.p. for the trial phase), having in any case to transmit the acts to the prosecuting body to contest the amended charge. It does not seem superfluous to question the advisability of keeping alive a phase that, despite its good track record during the “trial time”, is no longer able to fulfill its functions because of a system that has been overhauled compared to the one outlined by the 1988 Code.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


