This work investigates the European Union’s structural vulnerability in an increasingly polarized global economy, with ever more ‘weaponized’ interdependencies. Europe’s structural vulnerability is due to different interlinked and mutually reinforcing elements, which are the legacy of a self-defeating export-led growth model and a related economic policy set-up. We define structural vulnerability along four main dimensions – demand, supply, technology and critical raw materials – and discuss its main drivers. Highlighting the key role that Germany plays in shaping the EU growth model, we argue that the vicious circle between demand repression and supply deterioration has constrained innovation and growth, particularly in the southern periphery, making Europe more fragile in the face of external shocks. While acknowledging the recent change in the EU's industrial policy approach, we argue that inadequate coordination at EU level and the lack of common resources leave it to the fiscal capacity of individual Member States to bridge the technological gap, with the real risk of further widening the core-periphery gap and increasing the structural fragility of the Union.
Between Scylla and Charybdis: Long-term drivers of the EU structural vulnerability
Giuseppe Celi;
2024-01-01
Abstract
This work investigates the European Union’s structural vulnerability in an increasingly polarized global economy, with ever more ‘weaponized’ interdependencies. Europe’s structural vulnerability is due to different interlinked and mutually reinforcing elements, which are the legacy of a self-defeating export-led growth model and a related economic policy set-up. We define structural vulnerability along four main dimensions – demand, supply, technology and critical raw materials – and discuss its main drivers. Highlighting the key role that Germany plays in shaping the EU growth model, we argue that the vicious circle between demand repression and supply deterioration has constrained innovation and growth, particularly in the southern periphery, making Europe more fragile in the face of external shocks. While acknowledging the recent change in the EU's industrial policy approach, we argue that inadequate coordination at EU level and the lack of common resources leave it to the fiscal capacity of individual Member States to bridge the technological gap, with the real risk of further widening the core-periphery gap and increasing the structural fragility of the Union.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.