The metaphor of the judge as bouche de la loi, coined by Montesquieu in De l’Esprit des lois, established one of the cardinal ideal types of modern constitutionalism: the reduction of the judiciary to a “null power”, i.e. to a mere retelling of the legislator’s will. Despite boasting an unrivaled symbolic significance, not only does the maxim turn out to be inaccurate in summarizing Montesquieu’s juridical and political thought, but it also turns out to be impracticable, as it assumes a purely mechanical process of interpretation, which is coherent with neither the cognitive nor the evaluative syllogism. The paper delves into the reasons for the fame or, more often, the abandonment of Montesquieu’s teaching in Italian criminal law scholarship. The analysis goes through the various schools of thought (classic, positivist, Free Law Movement, Italian School of Legal Technicism), showcasing their lively internal composition and controversial hermeneutic approaches, in particular with regard to whether analogy is admissible or not. A common denominator can then be found not only in the constant awareness of the unbridgeable gap between law in the books and law in action, but also in the scholars’ shared goal, be it more or less express, of ensuring an ineliminable creative margin to legal science and, thus, to the judge.
La metafora del giudice bouche de la loi, coniata da Montesquieu nell’Esprit des lois, ha fissato uno dei cardini ideal-tipici del costituzionalismo moderno: la riduzione della giurisdizione a potere nullo, ossia a mera enunciazione della volontà del legislatore. Pur potendo fregiarsi d’una ineguagliata pregnanza simbolica, la massima non solo si rivela imprecisa nel riassumere il pensiero giuspolitico di Montesquieu, ma anche inattuabile, giacché presuppone un’interpretazione puramente meccanica non congrua né al sillogismo cognitivo né a quello valutativo. Il saggio sceglie di approfondire i motivi della fortuna o, piú di frequente, dell’accantonamento del canone montesquieviano nella penalistica italiana. L’analisi attraversa le diverse scuole (classica, positiva, gius-liberista, tecnico-giuridica) mostrandone le vivaci articolazioni interne e le controverse impostazioni ermeneutiche, con particolare riguardo all’ammissibilità del procedimento analogico. Emerge, quale denominatore comune, non solo la continua presa d’atto dell’incolmabile divario tra legalità proclamata e giurisprudenzialità effettiva, ma anche l’intenzione, piú o meno esplicita, degli studiosi di preservare alla scienza giuridica – e, di conserva, al giudice – un insopprimibile spazio creativo.
Bocca della legge: la metafora sgradita nella penalistica italiana (1748-1948)
MILETTI M. N.
2022-01-01
Abstract
The metaphor of the judge as bouche de la loi, coined by Montesquieu in De l’Esprit des lois, established one of the cardinal ideal types of modern constitutionalism: the reduction of the judiciary to a “null power”, i.e. to a mere retelling of the legislator’s will. Despite boasting an unrivaled symbolic significance, not only does the maxim turn out to be inaccurate in summarizing Montesquieu’s juridical and political thought, but it also turns out to be impracticable, as it assumes a purely mechanical process of interpretation, which is coherent with neither the cognitive nor the evaluative syllogism. The paper delves into the reasons for the fame or, more often, the abandonment of Montesquieu’s teaching in Italian criminal law scholarship. The analysis goes through the various schools of thought (classic, positivist, Free Law Movement, Italian School of Legal Technicism), showcasing their lively internal composition and controversial hermeneutic approaches, in particular with regard to whether analogy is admissible or not. A common denominator can then be found not only in the constant awareness of the unbridgeable gap between law in the books and law in action, but also in the scholars’ shared goal, be it more or less express, of ensuring an ineliminable creative margin to legal science and, thus, to the judge.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
