Principio di ragione e libertà del volere nella Nova Dilucidatio di Kant

This essay suggests a new interpretation of the first and the second part of the pre-critical Kant’s work “Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio” (1755). In this work Kant argues a new version of the basic metaphysical principles of the wolffian school, i.e. the principle of contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason. According to this new version of that principles Kant argues an idea of necessary existence and its relation with the concept of possibility that constitues the ground for a proof of God’s existence that refutes the cartesian formulation of this proof. The related conception of God’s action on contingency is crucial to understand the Kant’s conception of free will and his project to establish a new model of ethics. The relationship between metaphysical assumptions and his conception of free will allows Kant to ground the ethics on the principle of sufficient reason, like the wolffian school, and, at the same time, to avoid the accusation of determinism, that Crusius addresses to wolffian school. Starting from this assumption this essay draws attention on the importance of the Nova Dilucidatio for the future developements of Kant’s moral theory.