This paper uses a differential game approach to investigate a model that represents the exploitation of groundwater, taking into account the strategic and dynamic interactions among users of the resource and public authority. Agents’ behaviour may influence their gains but also the overexploitation of the aquifer. The effects of legal and illegal firms’ actions and the contribution of taxes and penalties imposed by public authorities, are analysed by studying Feedback equilibria in order to capture the problem of non-compliance with re- source management regimes and to discuss policy options in a non-cooperative and cooperative context. We show that illegal extractions can be a significant stumbling block on the path towards implementing of better management and environmental policies and we explain how, in order to fight this phenomenon, the public authority must increase controlled activity rather than taxation, but also encourage cooperation between legal firms under appropriate conditions.

Water taxes and fines imposed on legal and illegal firms exploiting groundwater

LUCIA MADDALENA;
2020-01-01

Abstract

This paper uses a differential game approach to investigate a model that represents the exploitation of groundwater, taking into account the strategic and dynamic interactions among users of the resource and public authority. Agents’ behaviour may influence their gains but also the overexploitation of the aquifer. The effects of legal and illegal firms’ actions and the contribution of taxes and penalties imposed by public authorities, are analysed by studying Feedback equilibria in order to capture the problem of non-compliance with re- source management regimes and to discuss policy options in a non-cooperative and cooperative context. We show that illegal extractions can be a significant stumbling block on the path towards implementing of better management and environmental policies and we explain how, in order to fight this phenomenon, the public authority must increase controlled activity rather than taxation, but also encourage cooperation between legal firms under appropriate conditions.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11369/398837
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