The shape of cost functions significantly influences the solution of optimization problems related to the treatment of infectious diseases. The classical linear or quadratic cost functions are widely used in the literature more to make the problems tractable than for their relevance with the model studied. For example, they do not seem appropriate when expensive therapies are required to treat a large number of patients, as in the case of the treatment of hepatitis C by sofosbuvir. In this paper, we study the strategic interactions between pharmaceutical companies and public authorities to determine the price of patented drugs and the number of treated infected people. A Stackelberg game and a Nash bargaining game are studied. In particular, we analyse the relationship between the different cost functions and the equilibria of the games.
PRICE AND TREATMENT DECISIONS IN EPIDEMICS: STACKELBERG AND BARGAINING GAME. THE ROLE OF COST FUNCTIONS.
DI LIDDO ANDREA
2019-01-01
Abstract
The shape of cost functions significantly influences the solution of optimization problems related to the treatment of infectious diseases. The classical linear or quadratic cost functions are widely used in the literature more to make the problems tractable than for their relevance with the model studied. For example, they do not seem appropriate when expensive therapies are required to treat a large number of patients, as in the case of the treatment of hepatitis C by sofosbuvir. In this paper, we study the strategic interactions between pharmaceutical companies and public authorities to determine the price of patented drugs and the number of treated infected people. A Stackelberg game and a Nash bargaining game are studied. In particular, we analyse the relationship between the different cost functions and the equilibria of the games.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
