In this paper, we study a duopoly model in which two symmetric firms exploit the same public renewable resource as an input for the production of a homogeneous good. We consider the case where the firms are provided with public incentives in order to prevent the resource exhaustion in a finite time horizon which coincides with the harvesting-license period. As a consequence, we consider a differential game in finite time horizon and compute the Open Loop and linear Feedback Nash Equilibria of the game. We study the social welfare and the optimal incentives polices derived from the solutions.
A Duopoly with Common Renewable Resource and Incentives
GRILLI, LUCA
;
2017-01-01
Abstract
In this paper, we study a duopoly model in which two symmetric firms exploit the same public renewable resource as an input for the production of a homogeneous good. We consider the case where the firms are provided with public incentives in order to prevent the resource exhaustion in a finite time horizon which coincides with the harvesting-license period. As a consequence, we consider a differential game in finite time horizon and compute the Open Loop and linear Feedback Nash Equilibria of the game. We study the social welfare and the optimal incentives polices derived from the solutions.File in questo prodotto:
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