In this paper we investigate, in a game theoretical context, the wheat market in Southern-Italy. In particular we consider the “Tavoliere” area in the Region Puglia, this geographical area is also known as “Il Granaio d’Italia2”. Once the wheat has been harvested the farmer could sell it in the market at the current market price which is determined in a specific Commodity Exchange. Nevertheless, the farmer uses to sell the wheat produced to an intermediate trader who will sell it in the market later on. As a result the farmer has to decide the optimal quantity to sell, given the market price and the intermediate trader’s price. The intermediate trader, on the other hand, has to fix, optimally, the price. In this paper we suppose that the trader and the farmer interact under Leader-Follower rule, where the trader is the Leader and the farmer is the Follower. Communitarian incentives to the farmer are also considered. We present the general case and we present optimal strategies for a particular case.

A Game Theoretical Study of the Wheat Market in Southern-Italy

GRILLI, LUCA;
2010-01-01

Abstract

In this paper we investigate, in a game theoretical context, the wheat market in Southern-Italy. In particular we consider the “Tavoliere” area in the Region Puglia, this geographical area is also known as “Il Granaio d’Italia2”. Once the wheat has been harvested the farmer could sell it in the market at the current market price which is determined in a specific Commodity Exchange. Nevertheless, the farmer uses to sell the wheat produced to an intermediate trader who will sell it in the market later on. As a result the farmer has to decide the optimal quantity to sell, given the market price and the intermediate trader’s price. The intermediate trader, on the other hand, has to fix, optimally, the price. In this paper we suppose that the trader and the farmer interact under Leader-Follower rule, where the trader is the Leader and the farmer is the Follower. Communitarian incentives to the farmer are also considered. We present the general case and we present optimal strategies for a particular case.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11369/26984
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